



**DAVE &
BUSTER'S**

CHICAGO BOOTH 
The University of Chicago Booth School of Business

Project Ding Ding Ding

Dave & Buster's Acquisition

OCTOBER 2023

Executive Summary

An acquisition of Dave & Buster’s presents an attractive investment opportunity given favorable transaction terms, strong positioning and performance within an attractive market, high potential for value creation, and an exceptional management team to partner and execute with

Background & Thesis

Company Background

Dave & Buster’s (“D&B”) is the largest operator of FECs¹ in the world, offering the ability to play games, watch sports, and eat/drink

Valuation

Dave & Buster’s is valued at a discount to peers, implying good value for its performance

Investment Thesis

- 1. Attractive Market**
The market is recession resilient given minimal impact from '09 financial crisis and is poised for strong growth on the heels of a quick COVID recovery
- 2. Strong Positioning**
Dave and Buster’s is poised to capture the “experience generation”, given its market leading role in a fragmented industry and compelling value proposition
- 3. Resilient Business**
Dave & Buster’s has shown macroeconomic resilience through strong year-one returns on unit launches, high-margin entertainment revenue growth, and stable cash flow generation
- 4. High Potential**
We see significant opportunity to generate value through top-line expansion, with new stores and revenue per store growth as drivers
- 5. Strong Management**
Management comes from Main Event and brings with them the exact playbook that Dave & Buster’s needs

Transaction Overview

The transaction acquires D&B with \$2.4B in sponsor equity and \$1.9B in debt at SOFR + 5.75%

| Purchasing Cost | | | | | | | |
|---|----------|---|----------|--|----------|---|--|
| \$ TERMS | | xEBITDA TERMS | | | | | |
| \$4.4B | = | \$1.1B | + | \$3.1B | + | \$0.2B | |
| TOTAL TXN COST | | BUYOUT OF DEBT | | BUYOUT OF EQUITY | | TXN FEES & CASH TO B/S | |
| Debt Funding | | | | Equity Funding | | | |
| Revolver | | Unitranche TL | | Sponsor Equity | | Other Equity | |
| \$500M undrawn revolver at SOFR + 4.75% | | \$1,900M secured debt at SOFR + 5.75% & 1% amortization | | \$2,421M in Sponsor Equity (4.3x) with 95.1% fully-diluted ownership | | \$100M in rollover equity (0.2x) with 3.9% fully-diluted ownership & 1% option pool | |

Operating Financials

We expect revenues to grow in line with the industry and EBITDA margins to stay roughly flat, resulting in '28P EBITDA of \$900M and strong FCF generation

| Base Case Financial Snapshot | | | | | | | |
|------------------------------|--------------|----------------------------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|---------|
| \$ in thousands | TTM at Close | Fiscal Years Ending December 31, | | | | | 5Y CAGR |
| | Dec'23 TTM E | 2024P | 2025P | 2026P | 2027P | 2028P | |
| Revenue | 2,319,163 | 2,557,399 | 2,832,745 | 3,123,960 | 3,431,820 | 3,757,133 | 10.1% |
| Y/Y Growth | 22.6% | 10.3% | 10.8% | 10.3% | 9.9% | 9.5% | — |
| Gross Profit | 1,960,983 | 2,161,863 | 2,393,998 | 2,639,415 | 2,898,756 | 3,172,695 | 10.1% |
| Margin | 84.6% | 84.5% | 84.5% | 84.5% | 84.5% | 84.4% | — |
| EBITDA | 557,122 | 614,579 | 680,997 | 751,275 | 825,603 | 904,179 | 10.2% |
| Margin | 24.0% | 24.0% | 24.0% | 24.0% | 24.1% | 24.1% | — |
| Unlevered FCF | 350,716 | 314,825 | 366,186 | 411,639 | 493,180 | 544,171 | 9.2% |
| Margin | 15.1% | 12.3% | 12.9% | 13.2% | 14.4% | 14.5% | — |

Returns

Base Case

The Base Case generates a healthy 20% IRR

20.1% IRR 2.5x MOIC

Bear Case

Downside returns invested capital by limiting discretionary capex

0.3% IRR 1.0x MOIC

Upside Cases

Upside returns showcase the high growth and uplift potential

Bull Case

27.7% IRR 3.4x MOIC

Mgmt. Case


37.2% IRR 4.9x MOIC

Footnotes:
¹Family Entertainment Centers

Company Description


Dave & Buster's is the leading owner and operator of family entertainment centers, with over 200 venues in North America that offer premier entertainment and dining experiences to guests across its two distinct brands: Dave & Buster's and Main Event

| Company Overview | |
|---|--|
| A unique and immersive experience that fosters social interaction, competition, and fun | |
| "Eatertainment Offering" | Dave & Buster's has developed a distinctive offering based on the customer value proposition: "Eat, Drink, Play, and Watch". The interaction between playing games, watching sports, dining and enjoying full-service bar areas is the defining feature of the customer experience |
| Main Event Acquisition | In Jun-22, Dave & Buster's acquired Main Event, placing it as the largest operator of family entertainment centers (FECs) in the world. Main Event brought over much of the management team who had a strong track record |
| Family & Young Adult Focus | The primary target for Dave & Buster's locations is young adults (21-39), while Main Event branded stores primarily focus on families with children |
| Owner / Operator | Dave and Buster's owns and operates all 211 locations, allowing for better quality control of the customer experience; they employ 23k employees of which c. 21k are store hourly employees |



Sources:
Dave and Buster's Investor Relations platform, Public Filings, Pitchbook, and Internal Booth Research Resources

Footnotes
1 Company Overview statistics as of Jan-23



Business Overview

Profitable growth through business cycles, a diversified revenue stream, and healthy margins makes Dave & Buster's an attractive buyout candidate from a historical financial perspective


Financial Highlights

High Growing: Dave & Buster's has a 10% revenue CAGR from '10-'22


Profitable: Margins have expanded c. +900 bps. since 2008 and has generated positive cash flow in 13 out of the last 15 years (cash flow negative in '20 from COVID and '15 from expansion investment)

Resilient: The business has grown in 13 out of the last 15 years, only shrinking 2% during the great financial crisis and during COVID


| Entertainment (65% Rev. / 70% Gross Profit) | Food & Beverage (35% Rev. / 30% Gross Profit) |
|---|--|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none">Higher margin entertainment sales outpaced F&B sales, as revenue mix shift from 47/53 to 65/35 todayEntertainment was more resilient during GFC with same-store sales (SSS) declining mid-single digits versus high single-digits+ for food & beverage | <ul style="list-style-type: none">Gross margins dropped to 71% in FY22 (typically c. 74%) largely due to commodity inflation, which has started to dissipateFrom '16-'19, SSS growth was -3%, which was 300 bps below peer group |



Dave & Buster's has grown revenue 13 out of the last 15 years and through multiple cycles



Diversified revenue stream drives healthy growth with downside protection















Sources: Dave and Buster's Investor Relations platform, Public Filings, Pitchbook, and Internal Booth Research Resources

Footnotes: ¹ FCF Conversion calculated as (EBITDA – Capex) / EBITDA

Primary Research Overview

To-date, the Deal Team has conducted interviews with five Company and industry professionals to better understand the potential for investment, which we have incorporated into our overall investment thesis and approach

| Individual | Experience | Diligence Focus Areas | Key Learnings |
|---|--|--|---|
| Chief Executive Officer (Dave and Buster's) |      | <i>Business strategy / model</i> <i>Growth opportunities</i> <i>Margin sustainability</i> <i>Main Event integration</i> <i>Recession risks</i> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> First mover advantage led to success for decades, but the market ultimately caught up. The previous management team was very risk-averse and did not invest enough in the business and brand Opportunity present to generate material growth through longer-term strategic initiatives, including data analytics / leverage, new entertainment offerings, and entering new markets Size and reach is a major strength in a fragmented industry; allows Dave & Buster's to deploy a "fast follower" approach where they can analyze value drivers and innovation at smaller players and incorporate into own business at scale Belief there is enough North America whitespace to grow 14-18 new units per year and eventually reach 500+ units; new smaller units have been successful in previously unreachable locations Resilient business model as the consumer trades down on entertainment in a worsening macro environment, providing a natural hedge given Dave & Buster's relatively affordable price point |
| Investment Banker (Houlihan Lokey) |  | <i>Industry drivers / risks</i> <i>Macro exposure</i> <i>Growth opportunities</i> <i>M&A market</i> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> "Eatertainment" / family entertainment centers (FECs) viewed as recession resilient due to affordability versus alternatives; many FEC concepts grew year-over-year during GFC Potential opportunity for Dave & Buster's if they can more effectively and efficiently capture small markets where boutique, local players operate Private equity has increased investment in industry post-COVID due to stable industry growth, reasonable capex spend, and high cash flow generation |
| Private Credit Investor (Audax Private Debt) |  Audax Group  | <i>State of credit markets</i> <i>Capital structure guidance</i> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Dave & Buster's has capacity to hold additional debt from current 2.5x net leverage Scaled business with growth levers can support a fixed charge coverage ratio around 1.1x Belief is that debt financing can likely be unitranche with margin between 550 - 575 bps |
| Equity Research Professional (William Blair) |   | <i>Growth opportunities</i> <i>Management effectiveness</i> <i>Valuation considerations</i> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Number of levers to pull on revenue with significant whitespace across US for new stores New management from Main Event is experienced and should bring over positive best practices Belief is that current valuation (5-6x EBITDA) is relatively cheap. If Dave & Buster's sees successful traction with expansion and remodeling, 10x EBITDA valuation would seem reasonable |
| ESG Analyst for Private Equity Firm (Coller Capital) |   | <i>ESG initiatives / opportunities</i> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Relatively safe investment from an ESG standpoint and no material issues cited in company's first sustainability report Opportunity to continue building on energy, water and waste management practices |

Key Investment Highlights

Dave and Buster's is well positioned in an attractive market, resulting in a resilient business with high potential for its strong management team to drive further value creation

INVESTMENT HIGHLIGHT #1

Attractive Market

The market is recession resilient given minimal impact from '09 financial crisis and is poised for strong growth on the heels of a quick COVID recovery

KEY NOTES

- **Recession Resiliency:** The industry showed resiliency against the broader economy during the Global Financial Crisis, largely due to persistent human demand for entertainment
- **Growth Outlook:** OOH Entertainment industry is expecting growth in the low double-digits in a post-COVID economy, with the fragmented Family Entertainment Centers (FECs) sub-sector projecting 9.8% growth

INVESTMENT HIGHLIGHT #2

Strong Positioning

Dave and Buster's is poised to capture the "experience generation", given its market leading role in a fragmented industry and compelling value proposition

KEY NOTES

- **Experience Generation:** Dave & Buster's target audiences are families (millennials) and young adults (Gen Z), who are entering their spending prime
- **Fragmented Market:** Dave & Buster's is the market leader in a fragmented market, enabling it to "watch from above" and take a "fast follower" approach to innovation in the space
- **Value Proposition:** Dave & Buster's offers a compelling value proposition – one where wealthier consumers trade down to in harsher macro conditions, preserving the top line

INVESTMENT HIGHLIGHT #3

Resilient Business

Dave & Buster's has shown macroeconomic resilience through strong year-one returns on unit launches, high-margin entertainment revenue growth, and stable cash flow generation

KEY NOTES

- **Great Financial Crisis:** Dave & Buster's only shrank 2% in FY09, outperformed the OOH Entertainment market, generated meaningful cash, and had good returns on new unit builds
- **Today's Resiliency:** Dave and Buster's is even more prepared to weather the effects of a downturn today given healthier revenue mix, demographic and geographic diversification, and +900 bps of margin expansion since the financial crisis

INVESTMENT HIGHLIGHT #4

High Potential

We see significant opportunity to generate value through top-line expansion, with store expansion and revenue per store growth as drivers

KEY NOTES

- **Store Expansion:** Strong unit economics support Dave & Buster's expansion plans in both the US and international markets. US market has significant room for new units in MSAs as well as smaller, less saturated MSAs
- **Revenue Per Store Growth:** Dave & Buster's has significant opportunities to boost revenue per store by elevating the customer experience through store renovations, improving marketing spending, updating prices, and refreshing the food & beverage menu

INVESTMENT HIGHLIGHT #5

Superb Management

Management comes from Main Event and brings with them the exact playbook that Dave & Buster's needs

KEY NOTES

- **Management:** The management team brings rich expertise in the OOH Entertainment; 4 out of 7 come from Main Event as part of the 2022 acquisition
- **Main Event Playbook:** Main Event management's playbook of unit growth, brand development, sales cultures, and operational discipline drove a 17% FY17-21 Adj. EBITDA CAGR versus 3% for their peers over the same period


Market Overview

The Out-of-Home Entertainment (OOH) market is recession resilient, as demonstrated during both the GFC and the COVID-19 pandemic, and is poised for an attractive growth rate on the heels of a quick COVID recovery


Historical Perspective

OOH Entertainment revenue has grown considerably over the past fifteen years and rebounded quickly after two macro crises

The industry showed resiliency against the broader economy during the Global Financial Crisis, largely due to persistent human demand for entertainment




Prior to COVID, the US OOH Entertainment industry was growing at a stable 5% CAGR and is expected to reach pre-COVID levels by the end of '23



Financial Crisis Case Studies

The best managed OOH Entertainment companies have yielded growth



Growth Outlook

The industry is projected to grow at a 9.8%... ... and the Street agrees for key players

- OOH Entertainment industry is expecting growth in the low double-digits in a post-COVID economy, with the **fragmented Family Entertainment Centers (FECs) sub-sector** projecting 9.8% growth
- Substantial growth driven by reenergized brands, pricing increases, and enhanced customer experiences



10.3%
CY22-'25
Revenue CAGR



10.3%
CY22-'25
Revenue CAGR



9.6%
CY22-'25
Revenue CAGR

Sources:
NASDAQ, Houlihan Lokey (Out-of-Home Entertainment: State of the Industry June 2023), Cannacord Genuity Capital Markets, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, company reports


Footnotes
1 OOH Entertainment includes cruise lines, movie theatres, live entertainment, outdoor activities / leisure, interactive entertainment, HIGHLIGHT parks

Market Positioning


Dave & Buster's is well-positioned for material growth driven by their growing experience-focused consumer base, a fragmented market ripe for disruption, and a compelling value proposition relative to entertainment peers / options

Key Highlights


Rise of the "Experience Generation"



Fragmented Market



Compelling Value Proposition



Details

- Millennials are Growing:** Millennials, US largest generation by population, are entering their earning prime. Annual spending of US households headed by Gen Zs and Millennials hit **\$2.5tr in '21 (30% of US total)**
- Millennials are Experience-Focused:** An Eventbrite study found 3 out of every 4 millennials would choose to spend money on a desirable experience or event over buying something desirable, and **61% of millennials and 63% of Gen Z said they plan on spending more on events this year versus last year**

- First Mover Advantage:** In the fast-growing FEC market, there are no scaled FEC competitors targeting Dave & Buster's demographic outside of TopGolf (5% of market). Most FECs are local, boutique players that serve customers within a 15-mile radius
- Scale Advantages:** Dave & Buster's has the advantage of analyzing revenue and traffic drivers at these smaller players and incorporating strong performers into their own offering at higher margins

- Cheaper Options Win in Downturns:** In a downturn, consumers historically have focused their discretionary spend largely on domestic / local vacation destinations and out-of-home entertainment options rather than extravagant international travel and entertainment
- D&B Has Favorable Price Positioning:** Dave and Buster's **relative transaction value to entertainment peers should support market share gains** within the out-of-home entertainment category, particularly if consumer spending pressures intensify


Supporting Evidence

Gen Z and Millennials Want to Splurge on Dining...

"Food and travel continued to be splurge-worthy categories among US consumers. Over the summer, **40 percent of Gen Z and millennials reported an intent to splurge on restaurants**" - McKinsey Report, October 2023


... and millennial families and Gen Z young adults are Dave and Buster's Main Customers

Audience Segmentation



▪ Families ▪ Adults

Dave & Buster's has the largest FEC market share¹...




Largely local, boutique players

\$30bn market projected to grow at 10% CAGR

DAVE & BUSTER'S TOPGOLF

... and is the most recognized brand


Brand Awareness



DAVE & BUSTER'S TOPGOLF Bowlero

Consumers trade down to Dave and Buster's when wallets tighten

Illustrative pricing per person per visit by entertainment option²



DAVE & BUSTER'S Regional parks SeaWorld Cedar Fair Six Flags Ski resorts Vail Premier Parks Walt Disney World Universal Studios Hollywood Sport events NFL MLB LIVE NATION ENTERTAINMENT CONCERTS GARDEN

Sources:
Internal survey of competitors' website, Insider Intelligence, Eventbrite, McKinsey Report (Stable and spending: An update on the state of the US consumer; Oct. 2023), Dave and Buster's 2021 Investor Presentation

Footnotes
¹ 2022 competitor analysis from major consulting practice
² Regional parks data as of Q4-22; ski resorts data as of Q2-23 (data represents mountain net revenue / total skier visits); all other data as of Q3-22

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Resilient Business Through Cycles

INVESTMENT HIGHLIGHT #3

Dave & Buster's has shown macroeconomic resilience through strong year-one returns on unit launches, high-margin entertainment revenue growth, and stable cash flow generation


Global Financial Crisis

Dave & Buster's performed well during the GFC...


Key Notes

- **Quick Return to Growth:** Revenue **only dropped 2%** in FY09 and then **returned on its growth trajectory**, driven by the entertainment segment and new builds
- **Strength Against Market:** Entertainment revenue grew and **outperformed the broader OOH Entertainment industry** over GFC
- **New Builds Remained Profitable:** From '08 to '13, new units had generated an average **year-one cash-on-cash return greater than 40%**, bottoming out at 28% in '09
- **Stable Margins:** From FY08-FY11, gross and EBITDA margins stayed within a 30 bps band and 250 bps band, respectively; lead to stable FCF generation over GFC
- **FCF Generation:** Dave & Buster's generated unlevered FCF every year during the GFC

OOH Entertainment revenue growth over GFC



Y1. new store cash-on-cash returns by GFC class




Dave & Buster's Today

... and Dave & Buster's is even better equipped for a macro downturn today

Key Notes

- **Healthier Revenue Mix:** Higher margin entertainment sales (40% flow-through) outpaced the food and beverage sales (10% flow-through); entertainment was more resilient during GFC with SSS declining mid-single digits versus high single-digits+ for food & beverage
- **Demographic Diversification:** Main Event targets a different, more-resilient demographic (families with kids), which was not a core customer base during GFC
- **Further Diversified Across US:** Since GFC, Dave & Buster's has grown to 211 stores across the US from 52 concentrated in Texas, New York, and California
- **Margin Expansion:** Margin growth (c. +900 bps since GFC) provides additional financial buffer in the event of a downturn

Revenue by Offering




Margin Expansion



Dave & Buster's has a strong track record of generating FCF through different business cycles

Great Financial Crisis

COVID



Sources:

Dave and Buster's Investor Relations platform, Public Filings, Pitchbook, and Internal Booth Research Resources, Houlihan Lokey (Out-of-Home Entertainment: State of the Industry June 2023)


Footnotes

¹ Today refers to Jul-23 TTM

Value Creation Levers

INVESTMENT HIGHLIGHT #4

We see significant opportunity to generate value through top-line expansion, with store expansion and revenue per store growth as drivers



Value Creation – Store Expansion Deep Dive

There is significant whitespace for geographic expansion and unit economics of new stores demonstrate economic feasibility

Whitespace in US & Overseas Markets


The US presents sizeable runway for expansion & international is a frontier

- 1 Dave & Buster's maintains **plenty of whitespace for new units across the US**, within both its top MSAs and smaller, less penetrated MSAs
- 2 Main Event's current footprint (South and Midwest-focus) is complementary to Dave & Buster's larger Northeast and West Coast presence
- 3 Potential for both brands to **expand within each other's focused area without a material cannibalization** threat due to the different entertainment options and demographic targets
- 4 Store per capita analysis shows **significant room to grow within the more populous, concentrated states** across the US
- 5 Based on our research to-date and conversations with industry experts, we believe there is an opportunity to expand to **500+ units in the US alone**
- 6 Next frontier of growth available **outside the US**; D&B can test international markets via a **franchising model** that would help diversify the current revenue mix **without adding significant cost or complexity into the current business**

Dave & Buster's Stores per Capita Analysis

| | Population (millions) | D&B Stores | Main Event Stores | Stores per Capita |
|-----------------------|-----------------------|------------------|-------------------|-------------------|
| California | 39.0 | 21 | 0 | 0.5 |
| Texas | 30.0 | 14 | 22 | 1.2 |
| New York | 22.2 | 9 | 3 | 0.5 |
| Florida | 19.7 | 13 | 0 | 0.7 |
| Pennsylvania | 13.0 | 7 | 0 | 0.5 |
| Ohio | 12.6 | 4 | 2 | 0.5 |
| Arizona | 11.8 | 6 | 0 | 0.5 |
| Georgia | 10.9 | 5 | 3 | 0.7 |
| Long-Term Target (US) | 335.6 (Current) | 500+ Total Units | | 0.7 |

Geographic Distribution of D&B Stores



Favorable Unit Economics


Strong cash-on-cash returns of new builds support expansion opportunity

- 1 Driven by healthy AUVs and attractive store margins, **average 4-Wall EBITDA for each active unit is c. \$4m**
- 2 Returns on the “new” mini-stores concept have been strong to-date and **enables effective penetration of smaller MSAs** largely dominated by smaller, boutique players
- 3 Ongoing **capex needs are relatively limited post-build out** (annual maintenance and games capex per unit is c. \$300k)
- 4 Success rate of new builds has historically been high, with **no units currently running a negative 4-Wall EBITDA and no closures since 2016**
- 5 Stores typically see **high volumes year one**, leading to a 35% target year-one cash-on-cash returns

Dave & Buster's Store Returns

| | New Mini-Stores | Traditional Build |
|---|-----------------|-------------------|
| # of Stores | 5 | 211 |
| Square Feet | 15-25k | 30-45k |
| Recent NDC ⁽¹⁾ | \$6.6m | \$7.7m |
| Avg. Revenue | \$8m | \$11m |
| Avg. 4-Wall EBITDA | \$3m | \$4m |
| Avg. 4-Wall EBITDA margin | 40% | 35% |
| Avg. 4-Wall EBITDA / NDC ⁽¹⁾ | 45% | 50% |

Target Cash Returns vs. Peer Group



Sources: Dave and Buster's Investor Relations platform, Public Filings, US Census Bureau, UBS research report

Footnotes: ¹ Net development costs for stores built since 2018; costs include equipment, building, leaseholds and site costs, net of tenant improvement allowances and other landlord payments, excluding pre-opening costs and capitalized interest

Value Creation – Revenue Per Store Deep Dive

INVESTMENT HIGHLIGHT #4

Underinvestment in the brand leaves significant opportunity to unleash further EBITDA potential via efficiency gains from existing units

KEY INSIGHT

Underinvested Stores

Dave & Buster's last remodel cycle began 2011 and is overdue for a refresh to its look and feel



Current Stores

IDEAS

Remodel Cycle

A remodel cycle can drive incremental foot traffic and increase engagement by modernizing look & feel, upgrading technology for guest engagement, and improve layout




New Store Concept

+ VISITORS

KEY INSIGHT

Unoptimized Sales & Marketing

Dave & Buster's is inefficiently spending its marketing budget and not driving customers to its highest satisfaction offerings: watch and special occasions



IDEAS

Marketing Optimization

D&B can look to optimize marketing messaging & channel mix to drive better conversion

Sports Betting

D&B can improve value prop. by partnering with a betting platform and creating an in-person betting experience

Occasions Focus

D&B can market and train employees to promote special occasion opportunities

+ VISITORS

KEY INSIGHT

Archaic Pricing

Dave and Buster's does not have peak demand or geographic pricing and has not raised prices in 20 years!



IDEAS

New Pricing Model

Dave & Buster's can invest in a dynamic pricing model based on geography and peak/trough demand to capture more value and raise prices to be more closely in-line with competitors (e.g., +20% over 5 year holding period)

+ ENTERTAIN.

KEY INSIGHT

Declining Food & Beverage

Historically, 57% of customers ordered food compared with 39% today



IDEAS

Revamped Food & Beverage Menu

D&B can invest in a redesigned menu to improve price / value proposition of its food and beverage offerings (incl. alcohol)

Tech-Enabled Ordering System

D&B can create a new ordering system to improve ordering experience, streamline food operations, and create dynamic menu offers & advertising

+ FOOD & BEV.

Sources:

Dave and Buster's Investor Presentation, Primary Research with Dave and Buster's CEO

Management Team

The majority of Dave & Buster’s current management team comes from Main Event and has a strong track record of growing units, nurturing brands, and developing sales cultures – exactly what Dave & Buster’s needs

★ From Main Event Acquisition

The management team brings rich expertise in OOH Entertainment; 4 out of 7 come from Main Event as part of the 2022 acquisition

| | Name and Title | Years at D&B | Industry Exp. | Prior Experience |
|--|--|--------------|---------------|--|
|  | Chris Morris Chief Executive Officer | 1 Year | 30+ Years | ★ Chief Executive Officer, Main Event • President, California Pizza Kitchen • Chief Financial Officer, On the Border |
|  | Michael Quartieri Chief Financial Officer | 2 Years | 30+ Years | • Executive Vice President, LiveOne, Inc. • Chief Financial Officer, Scientific Games • Senior Vice President, Las Vegas Sands Corp. |
|  | Tony Wehner Chief Operating Officer | 1 Year | 30+ Years | ★ Chief Operating Officer, Main Event • Chief Executive Officer, BigShots Golf • Chief Operations Officer, Bar Louie |
|  | Ashley Zickefoose Chief Marketing Officer | 1 Year | 25+ Years | ★ Chief Marketing Officer, Main Event • Chief Marketing Officer, CEC Entertainment • Chief Marketing Officer, On the Border |
|  | Steve Klohn Chief Information Officer | 1 Year | 30+ Years | ★ Chief Information Officer, Main Event • Chief Technology Officer, Brinker International • Senior Vice President Technology, RealPage |
|  | John Mulleady Chief Development Officer | 11 Years | 30+ Years | • Director of Real Estate, BJ's Wholesale Club, Inc. • Vice President of Real Estate, Circuit City |
|  | Antonio Bautista Chief International Development Officer | 2 Years | 30+ Years | • Chief Executive Officer, ALBP Global Hospitality • Chief Operations Officer, Fogo De Chao • Senior Vice President, Hard Rock Cafe (Retail) |

Main Event Playbook

Main Event Management’s Playbook of unit growth, brand development, sales cultures, and operational discipline drove their massive success

Unit Growth

Grew from 9 units in '11 to 53 by the end of '22 (17% CAGR) with strong 25%+ target cash-on-cash returns by overhauling the real estate strategy for new units

Brand Building

By refining the brand (focus on families), adjusting the marketing approach, and improving the customer experience, SSS grew 23% from FY19 to FY22

Sales Culture

Special events business bookings increased through dedicated marketing and sales team with a performance-based compensation structure and efficient advertising investments

Ops. Discipline

Margin improvements by diligently tracking KPIs vs. benchmarks and more efficient labor scheduling and inventory management


Results

Results


Results

Results

Outperformance vs. Peers¹



Strong SSS growth trajectory



Sources: Dave and Buster’s Investor Relations platform, Public Filings, Pitchbook, and Internal Booth Research Resources

Footnotes: ¹ Peers includes Bowlero, Topgolf, Darden Restaurants, Texas Roadhouse, Brinker International, Bloomin’ Brands, BJ’s restaurants, Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, Cheesecake Factory, Six Flags Entertainment, SeaWorld Entertainment, Cedar Fair and Vail Resorts

Investment Risks and Mitigants; ESG



Investment team strongly considers major risk factors and the most fluid inputs to these risks to develop and maintain pre-planned responses for rapid implementation at any time

| Key Risks | | Mitigant |
|--|--|--|
| Supply Risk | Inflation impact on commodity and labor costs <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Dave & Buster's may not be able to adjust prices sufficiently to offset the impact of various cost increases without negatively impacting customer demand Increase in wages, including a rise in the federal minimum wage, could lead to difficulty in attracting and retaining talent; labor shortages could adversely impact operations of existing stores and opening of new stores | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Entertainment Offering: Low-cost entertainment offering (65% of revenue) less impacted by inflationary pressures Guest-serving Technology Services: Expediate roll-out throughout stores to optimize the distribution of customer service responsibilities between technology and staff, decreasing labor demand Price Hedging: Explore ways to hedge the price of food and beverage with futures contracts or other financial risk management strategies |
| | Changes in consumer preferences and buying patterns <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Customer preferences could decrease foot traffic to the "brick and mortar" store Change in consumer dietary preferences | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Modularized Remodels: Remodels with a modularized layout can bring in new fast-following innovation to compete with changing tastes and preferences, enabling D&B to perpetually be relevant to the consumer Ride Sports Evergreen Demand: Dave & Buster's unique "sports watching" arena experience brings in year-round foot traffic to social sports watchers Loyalty: Invest further in loyalty programs to drive retention and engagement from customers M&A: Consider tuck in acquisitions to diversify entertainment offerings and consumer demographic profiles |
| | Macroeconomic effect on commercial real estate and development projects <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Construction costs for store expansions and renovations may exceed the budget Leases become too expensive to justify return on investment for renewals or new builds The complexes housing Dave & Buster's locations could become vacant, reducing foot traffic Leases are often long-term and non-cancelable | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Performance on Previous Development Projects: Dave & Buster's has an average 4-Wall EBITDA per operational unit of \$4m and an average cash-on-cash return on store expansions from FY08-18 of 49% Incremental Expansion: Strategically add stores with intervals between each expansion to monitor new unit performance Explore New Broker Networks: Build relationships between current development team and new broker networks for access to larger pool of qualified potential sites |
| ESG Notes | | |
| Energy Mgmt. <p>All stores have transitioned from incandescent and CFL to more eco-friendly LED light fixtures. D&B has also installed lighting control systems that improve energy efficiency as well as energy control programs HVAC systems to manage energy consumption</p> | Water Mgmt. <p>All units use plumbing fixtures with automatic shut-off faucets, reducing water consumption by 50% for lavatories and 20% for water closets</p> <p>To reduce water use, we would look to install high-efficiency pre-rinse spray valves across all kitchen units</p> | DEI <p>Racial minorities make up c. 65% of the Dave & Buster's US workforce. We would back D&B's commitment to driving further representation of women and team members who are Black, Indigenous, or People of Color (BIPOC) in our corporate and field leadership before the end of FY25</p> |

Public Comparables

The deal team’s view is a combination of large-scale US-centric entertainment and casual dining companies is the best representative peer group, which is supportive of a high single-digit acquisition multiple and implies Dave & Buster’s is trading at a discount, given its financial performance

| Public Comparables | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|--|--------------|------------------|-------------|---------|--------|---------------|--------------------------|--------------|-------------|-----------------------------|------|---------------------------------|-------|
| Company Name | Ticker | Enterprise Value | | Revenue | LTM | | FCF Conv. ⁽¹⁾ | CY19-CY22 | | TEV/ Revenue ⁽²⁾ | | TEV / LTM EBITDA ⁽²⁾ | |
| | | Total | Excl. Oper. | | EBITDA | EBITDA Margin | | Revenue CAGR | EBITDA CAGR | LTM | '23E | LTM | '23E |
| Dave & Buster's Entertainment, Inc. | NASDAQ: PLAY | 4,291 | 2,710 | 2,184 | 518 | 24% | 48% | 12.6% | 15.5% | 1.2x | 1.2x | 5.2x | 5.0x |
| Entertainment Peers | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Cinemark Holdings, Inc. | NYSE:CNK | 4,893 | 3,572 | 2,803 | 472 | 17% | 74% | -9.5% | -24.2% | 1.3x | 1.2x | 7.6x | 6.2x |
| Topgolf Callaway Brands Corp. | NYSE:MODG | 6,334 | 4,836 | 4,187 | 464 | 11% | -19% | 33.0% | 38.7% | 1.2x | 1.1x | 10.4x | 7.8x |
| Bowlero Corp. | NYSE:BOWL | 3,918 | 3,393 | 1,059 | 307 | 29% | 51% | n/a | n/a | 3.2x | 3.1x | 11.1x | 9.5x |
| Six Flags Entertainment Corporation | NYSE:SIX | 4,760 | 3,835 | 1,371 | 474 | 35% | 73% | -2.8% | -4.8% | 2.8x | 2.7x | 8.1x | 7.6x |
| Median | | 4,827 | 3,704 | 2,087 | 468 | 23% | 62% | -2.8% | -4.8% | 2.0x | 1.9x | 9.3x | 7.7x |
| Average | | 4,976 | 3,909 | 2,355 | 429 | 23% | 45% | 6.9% | 3.2% | 2.1x | 2.0x | 9.3x | 7.8x |
| Casual Dining Peers | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Bloomin' Brands, Inc. | NASDAQ:BLMN | 3,996 | 2,700 | 4,548 | 544 | 12% | 48% | 2.3% | 7.5% | 0.6x | 0.6x | 5.0x | 4.8x |
| Brinker International, Inc. | NYSE:EAT | 3,487 | 2,345 | 4,133 | 342 | 8% | 46% | 5.8% | -7.1% | 0.6x | 0.6x | 6.9x | 6.0x |
| The Cheesecake Factory Incorporated | NASDAQ:CAKE | 3,235 | 1,937 | 3,409 | 204 | 6% | 37% | 10.4% | -6.3% | 0.6x | 0.6x | 9.5x | 7.7x |
| Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, Inc. | NASDAQ:CBRL | 2,638 | 1,899 | 3,443 | 239 | 7% | 47% | 2.8% | -15.4% | 0.6x | 0.6x | 7.9x | 7.6x |
| Darden Restaurants, Inc. | NYSE:DRI | 22,868 | 19,732 | 10,772 | 1,616 | 15% | 63% | 4.6% | 6.8% | 1.8x | 1.8x | 12.2x | 11.7x |
| Texas Roadhouse, Inc. | NASDAQ:TXRH | 6,805 | 6,300 | 4,348 | 485 | 11% | 40% | 13.6% | 14.3% | 1.4x | 1.4x | 13.0x | 12.3x |
| Median | | 3,742 | 2,523 | 4,241 | 414 | 10% | 46% | 5.2% | 0.3% | 0.6x | 0.6x | 8.7x | 7.6x |
| Average | | 7,171 | 5,819 | 5,109 | 572 | 10% | 47% | 6.6% | 0.0% | 0.9x | 0.9x | 9.1x | 8.3x |



Sources:
S&P CapitalIQ (as of October 23, 2023); all figures (excluding percentages and multiples) in USD millions

Footnotes
¹ FCF Conversion calculated as (EBITDA – Capex) / EBITDA
² Valuation multiples off TEV excluding operating leases (industry convention)
³ For time series analysis, pre-COVID timeframe from Sep-15 to Sep-19 and post-COVID timeframe from Dec-21 to present day

Precedent Transactions

While precedent transactions for comparable assets in casual dining and out-of-home entertainment markets have generally traded at high single to low double-digit EBITDA multiple, our primary research and conversations with bankers suggest a 7.5x multiple is a reasonable entry price for D&B

KEY TAKEAWAYS

1. Casual Dining Acquisition Multiple

For casual dining comps, previous larger transactions suggest scale and margin profile are key drivers of multiple. Dave & Buster's larger scale (\$2bn+ revenue) and higher margins (+1,000 bps) compared to the peer set average support a high single-digit LTM EBITDA acquisition multiple

2. Entertainment vs. Casual Dining

Over the past five years, entertainment comps have generally traded at a c. 20% discount to casual dining peers, with the discount growing in recent years due to concerns around the impact of challenged consumer spending implying a mid- to high-single digit multiple for Dave and Buster's

3. Universe of Acquirers

Transactions were limited during COVID ('19-'21) as peer markets were impacted by nationwide lockdowns. Post-COVID, deal flow has picked up with a strong blend between strategic acquirors and financial sponsors, suggesting a widespread M&A exit buyer universe


4. Historical Buyout at 7.5x

To note, Oak Hill Capital Partners acquired Dave & Buster's at a 7.5x LTM EBITDA multiple in 2010

Precedent Transactions

| Date | Acquiror | Target | Transaction Value | LTM Revenue | LTM EBITDA | LTM EBITDA Margin | TEV / LTM Revenue | TEV / LTM EBITDA |
|---|-------------------------------------|--------------------------|-------------------|-------------|------------|-------------------|-------------------|------------------|
| Casual Dining Comps | | | | | | | | |
| Dec-17 | NRD Capital Management | Ruby Tuesday | 314 | 1,046 | 37 | 4% | 0.3x | 8.5x |
| Feb-18 | Arby's (Roark Capital) | Buffalo Wild Wings | 2,885 | 2,061 | 255 | 12% | 1.4x | 11.3x |
| Jun-23 | Darden (NYSE:DRI) | Ruth's Hospitality Group | 715 | 500+ | 69 | ~14% | n/a | 10.3x |
| Aug-23 (Announced) | Bain Capital | Fogo de Chão | 1,100 | n/a | 94 | n/a | n/a | 11.7x |
| Entertainment Comps | | | | | | | | |
| Apr-19 (Not completed) | Leo Holdings Corp. | CEC Entertainment | 1,400 | 913 | 187 | 20% | 1.5x | 7.5x |
| Mar-21 | Callaway (NYSE:ELY) | Topgolf | 2,541 | 1,059 | 59 | 6% | 2.4x | 43.1x |
| Sep-23 | Bowlero (NYSE:BOWL) | Lucky Strike | 90 | 87 | 11 | 13% | 1.0x | 8.2x |
| Jun-22 | Dave & Buster's Entertainment, Inc. | Main Event | 835 | 365 | 93 | 25% | 2.3x | 9.0x |
| Including \$20m projected synergies with Dave & Buster's: | | | | | | | | 7.4x |
| Median | | | 968 | 980 | 81 | 13% | 1.5x | 9.7x |
| Average | | | 1,235 | 922 | 101 | 13% | 1.5x | 13.7x |
| NASDAQ: PLAY | | | | | | | | |
| Delta to Median | | | +1,743 | +1,205 | +437 | +11% | (0.2x) | (4.4x) |

Acquisition Valuation Benchmarking



Sources:
S&P CapitalIQ (as of October 23, 2023), Public Filings, Pitchbook, and Internal Booth Research Resources

Footnotes
¹ Topgolf acquisition valued at c. 16x '22E EBITDA (assuming Topgolf added \$100m on top of the \$59m in '19 through the opening of c. 20 locations and \$5m in EBITDA per location)
² Fogo de Chão acquisition multiple off FY '19 EBITDA

Transaction Overview

The proposed transaction acquires Dave & Buster’s for \$4.2B TEV excl. fees and is funded with 57% equity (95.1% sponsor fully diluted ownership) and 43% debt (\$1.9B unitranche term loan at SOFR + 5.75%)

| Funding Sources and Uses | | | | | | | |
|--|-----------|------|------|------------------|-----------|------|------|
| We will fund the \$4,178 purchase price (+75% premium to market) and \$242m in estimated fees & cash to B/S with 43% debt and 57% equity | | | | | | | |
| Sources | \$ | x | % | Uses | \$ | x | % |
| Revolver | – | – | – | Buyout of Equity | 3,086,367 | 5.5x | 70% |
| Term Loan | 1,900,000 | 3.4x | 43% | Buyout of Debt | 1,092,047 | 2.0x | 25% |
| Secured Notes | – | – | – | Cash to B/S | 100,000 | 0.2x | 2% |
| Rollover Equity | 100,000 | 0.2x | 2% | Transaction Fees | 104,460 | 0.2x | 2% |
| Sponsor Equity | 2,420,874 | 4.3x | 55% | Financing Fees | 38,000 | 0.1x | 1% |
| Total Sources | 4,420,874 | 7.9x | 100% | Total Uses | 4,420,874 | 7.9x | 100% |

| Capitalization & Sponsor Ownership | | | | | |
|---|-----------|---------|---------|---------------------|---------------|
| This capitalization results in a 3.2x net leverage ratio and 95.1% fully diluted sponsor equity ownership | | | | | |
| Capitalization Table at Close | | | | Pro-Forma Ownership | |
| | Dec' 23P | xEBITDA | Total % | Basic | Fully Diluted |
| Revolver | – | – | – | | |
| Term Loan | 1,900,000 | 3.4x | 44.0% | | |
| Secured Notes | – | – | – | | |
| Gross Debt | 1,900,000 | 3.4x | 44.0% | | |
| Cash | (100,000) | (0.2x) | (2.3%) | | |
| Net Debt | 1,800,000 | 3.2x | 41.7% | | |
| Rollover Equity | 100,000 | 0.2x | 2.3% | 4.0% | 3.9% |
| Sponsor Equity | 2,420,874 | 4.3x | 56.0% | 96.0% | 95.1% |
| Option Pool | – | – | – | – | 1.0% |
| Total Capitalization | 4,320,874 | 7.8x | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% |

| Preliminary Financing Indication ¹ | | | |
|---|--|--|---------------|
| Based on preliminary financing indications, we will take on a \$1,900 unitranche TL (net 3.2x EBITDA) at SOFR + 5.75% and a \$500M undrawn revolver | | | |
| NOT USED For informational purposes | | | |
| | Revolver | Term Loan | Secured Notes |
| Capacity | \$500M | Up to \$1,900M Secured Debt ² | |
| Usage | \$0 (Undrawn) | \$1,900M | \$0 |
| Coupon & Fees | SOFR + 4.75% | SOFR + 5.75% | 12% (PIK) |
| Maturity | 6 years | 6 years | 7 years |
| Amortization & Fees | 0.5% Undrawn Fee | 1% Amortization | None |
| Prepayment | None | 1% Premium | None |
| Covenants | Net Leverage < 4.0x TTM aEBITDA | | |
| Restrictions | Can take on additional debt if (1) Net Leverage < 4.0x TTM aEBITDA, (2) FCCR > 1.1x, and (3) is second-lien or unsecured | | |

Sources:
Team Analysis

Footnotes:
¹Preliminary financing indication provided by Audax Private Debt
²Based on minimum Fixed Charge Coverage Ratio of > 1.1x

Scenarios Overview

The Base Case generates a healthy 20% IRR, while the downside returns invested capital via removing discretionary capex and upside cases showcase the high growth and uplift potential

| | | Bear Case | Base Case | Bull Case | Management Case |
|-------------------------|----------------------|---|---|---|--|
| Returns | IRR | 0.3% | 20.1% | 27.7% | 37.7% |
| | MOIC | 1.0x | 2.5x | 3.4x | 4.9x |
| Transaction Assumptions | Entry Multiple | • Purchase at 7.5x EBITDA , a +76% premium to market price | | | |
| | Exit Multiple | • Same as entry multiple – 7.5x EBITDA | | | • 8.5x EBITDA (+1x Mult. Exp.) |
| | Debt Funding | • 2.9x EBITDA (43% debt, 57% equity) | | | |
| Operating Assumptions | Revenue Growth | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 5Y CAGR of (1.0%). • Remodel and store expansion proves to be value-destructive, resulting in +2.6% store expansion • Macro headwinds deteriorate organic growth resulting in (4.0%) revenue per store growth. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 5Y CAGR of +10.1%. • Remodels and store expansion captures latent demand and rejuvenates the brand, resulting in +6.5% store expansion • Organic growth slightly outpaces macro at +3.4% revenue per store, driven by F&B growth | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 5Y CAGR of +14.4%. • Remodels and store expansion revitalizes demand & generates brand excitement, resulting in +6.5% store expansion • Revenue per store outperforms macro at +6.5% revenue per store, driven by F&B growth | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 5Y CAGR of +18.6%. • Remodels and store expansion are a massive success, leading to +7.2% store expansion • Success leads significant macro outperformance, with +10.7% revenue per store, driven by both F&B and entertainment |
| | Gross Margin | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Margins decline from 84.6% to 83.1% over the 5 years due to pricing pressure. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Margins decline from 84.6% to 84.4% due to mix shift towards F&B revenues. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Margins remain at 84.6% as mix shift towards F&B revenues is offset by operational efficiencies | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Margins increase from 84.6% to 84.9% due to operational efficiencies |
| | Operating Expenses | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • OpEx increases from (60.5%) of sales to (61.5%) of sales due to deficiencies at lower scale | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • OpEx remains in line with historicals at (60.4%) of sales | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • OpEx improves vs historicals to (60.0%) from operational efficiencies | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • OpEx improves vs historicals to (59.8%) from operational efficiencies |
| | Capital Expenditures | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • \$0.9B in 5Y Capex (7.8% of sales) from reducing discretionary capex by 42% vs. Base Case | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • \$1.6B in 5Y Capex (10.5% of sales) from store expansion and remodeling | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • \$1.7B in 5Y Capex (9.7% of sales) from store expansion and remodeling | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • \$1.8B in 5Y Capex (8.4% of sales) from store expansion and remodeling |
| | Working Capital | • Assets and Liabilities grow in line with core operating metrics (sales, COGS, OpEx) at historical rates | | | |

Base Case Financials

A strong financial model, driven by revenue growth & strong flow through to FCF, enables us to pay down ~75% of debt by Y5, yielding a 2.5x MOIC

With revenue growing in line with the market, we expect to grow EBITDA to \$900M and generate \$2.1B in unlevered free cash flow over our 5-year holding period

| \$ in thousands | Fiscal Years Ending January, | | | | | TTM at Close | Fiscal Years Ending December 31, | | | | | CAGR | |
|---------------------------------|------------------------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-------------|--------------|----------------------------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|---------|---------|
| | 2019A | 2020A | 2021A | 2022A | 2023A | Dec'23 TTM E | 2024P | 2025P | 2026P | 2027P | 2028P | 19-'23A | 24-'28P |
| Financial Forecast | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Food & Beverage Revenue | 536,469 | 563,576 | 159,501 | 436,637 | 678,333 | 801,602 | 888,980 | 990,285 | 1,098,271 | 1,213,312 | 1,335,798 | 6.0% | 10.8% |
| Entertainment Revenue | 728,832 | 791,115 | 277,011 | 867,419 | 1,286,094 | 1,517,561 | 1,668,418 | 1,842,460 | 2,025,689 | 2,218,508 | 2,421,335 | 15.3% | 9.8% |
| Total Revenues | 1,265,301 | 1,354,691 | 436,512 | 1,304,056 | 1,964,427 | 2,319,163 | 2,557,399 | 2,832,745 | 3,123,960 | 3,431,820 | 3,757,133 | 11.6% | 10.1% |
| Cost of Food and Beverages | (139,199) | (148,196) | (45,207) | (119,123) | (193,742) | (222,485) | (246,646) | (274,652) | (304,489) | (336,260) | (370,070) | 8.6% | 10.7% |
| Cost of Entertainment | (81,064) | (85,115) | (29,698) | (85,848) | (115,122) | (135,695) | (148,889) | (164,095) | (180,056) | (196,803) | (214,368) | 9.2% | 9.6% |
| Gross Profit | 1,045,038 | 1,121,380 | 361,607 | 1,099,085 | 1,655,563 | 1,960,983 | 2,161,863 | 2,393,998 | 2,639,415 | 2,898,756 | 3,172,695 | 12.2% | 10.1% |
| % of Revenue | 82.6% | 82.8% | 82.8% | 84.3% | 84.3% | 84.6% | 84.5% | 84.5% | 84.5% | 84.5% | 84.4% | 0.5% | (0.0%) |
| OpEx | (764,506) | (838,986) | (461,141) | (767,982) | (1,195,190) | (1,403,862) | (1,547,284) | (1,713,001) | (1,888,140) | (2,073,154) | (2,268,516) | 11.8% | 10.1% |
| Diligence Adjusted EBITDA | 280,532 | 282,394 | (99,534) | 331,103 | 460,373 | 557,122 | 614,579 | 680,997 | 751,275 | 825,603 | 904,179 | 13.2% | 10.2% |
| % of Revenue | 22.2% | 20.8% | (22.8%) | 25.4% | 23.4% | 24.0% | 24.0% | 24.0% | 24.0% | 24.1% | 24.1% | | |
| Taxes | (30,666) | (26,879) | 83,432 | (19,014) | (36,531) | (42,413) | (39,001) | (55,386) | (72,916) | (91,357) | (113,951) | | |
| Non-Cash Expenses | 9,592 | 9,740 | 25,356 | 24,346 | 64,872 | 48,149 | 5,429 | 5,429 | 5,429 | 5,429 | 5,429 | | |
| Changes in Working Capital | 92,528 | 46,483 | (6,395) | 11,813 | 73,159 | 64,434 | 56,118 | 68,647 | 72,552 | 76,645 | 80,935 | | |
| Capex | (216,286) | (228,091) | (83,016) | (92,197) | (234,224) | (276,576) | (322,300) | (333,500) | (344,700) | (323,140) | (332,420) | | |
| Unlevered Cash Flow | 135,700 | 83,647 | (80,157) | 256,051 | 327,649 | 350,716 | 314,825 | 366,186 | 411,639 | 493,180 | 544,171 | | |
| Interest Expense | | | | | | | (214,457) | (184,271) | (153,761) | (124,018) | (85,258) | | |
| Mandatory Debt Payments | | | | | | | (19,000) | (19,000) | (19,000) | (19,000) | (19,000) | | |
| Levered Cash Flow | | | | | | | 81,368 | 162,915 | 238,878 | 350,162 | 439,913 | | |
| Optional Debt Payment | | | | | | | (81,368) | (162,915) | (238,878) | (350,161) | (439,913) | | |
| Levered Cash Flow After Paydown | | | | | | | - | - | - | - | - | | |

Debt Paydown

We are able to pay off 75% of debt with generated cash

| \$ in thousands | TTM at Close | Fiscal Years Ending December 31, | | | | |
|--------------------------------------|--------------|----------------------------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|
| | Dec'23 TTM E | 2024P | 2025P | 2026P | 2027P | 2028P |
| Debt Balance | | | | | | |
| Revolver | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| Term Loan | 1,900,000 | 1,799,632 | 1,617,717 | 1,359,839 | 990,678 | 531,764 |
| Secured Notes | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| Less: Cash | (100,000) | (100,000) | (100,000) | (100,000) | (100,000) | (100,000) |
| Net Debt | 1,800,000 | 1,699,632 | 1,517,717 | 1,259,839 | 890,678 | 431,764 |
| Leverage Ratios | | | | | | |
| Net Leverage Ratio -- 4.0x Covenant | 3.2x | 2.8x | 2.2x | 1.7x | 1.1x | 0.5x |
| Debt Service Coverage Ratio | | 1.1x | 1.4x | 1.9x | 2.9x | 4.4x |
| Creditor Fixed Charge Coverage Ratio | | 1.1x | 1.3x | 1.7x | 2.1x | 2.6x |



Equity Returns

EBITDA expansion and debt paydown lead to a 2.5x MOIC

| \$ in thousands | TTM at Close | Fiscal Years Ending December 31, | | | | |
|-----------------------------------|--------------|----------------------------------|-------------|-------------|-----------|-----------|
| | Dec'23 TTM E | 2024P | 2025P | 2026P | 2027P | 2028P |
| Diligence Adjusted EBITDA | \$557,122 | \$614,579 | \$680,997 | \$751,275 | \$825,603 | \$904,179 |
| Exit Multiple | 7.5x | 7.5x | 7.5x | 7.5x | 7.5x | 7.5x |
| Enterprise Value | 4,178,413 | 4,609,343 | 5,107,474 | 5,634,560 | 6,192,021 | 6,781,343 |
| Cash | 100,000 | 100,000 | 100,000 | 100,000 | 100,000 | 100,000 |
| Transaction Costs | 142,460 | - | - | - | - | - |
| Revolver | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| Term Loan | (1,900,000) | (1,799,632) | (1,617,717) | (1,359,839) | (990,678) | (531,764) |
| Secured Notes | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| Total Equity Value | 2,520,874 | 2,909,711 | 3,589,757 | 4,374,721 | 5,301,344 | 6,349,579 |
| Sponsor Equity, % of Total Equity | 96.0% | 95.1% | 95.1% | 95.1% | 95.1% | 95.1% |
| Sponsor Equity | 2,420,874 | 2,766,344 | 3,412,882 | 4,159,169 | 5,040,135 | 6,036,722 |
| MOIC | | | | | | |
| IRR | | 1.1x | 1.4x | 1.7x | 2.1x | 2.5x |
| | | 14.3% | 18.7% | 19.8% | 20.1% | 20.1% |

Base Case Adjusted EBITDA and Returns Bridge

Sponsor returns are primarily generated from EBITDA growth, which is primarily generated from store expansion



Upside & Downside Financials

The team believes that there is sufficient downside protection given the strong cash generation of the business and the ability to preserve cash by removing \$700M in discretionary Capex; the upside provides tremendous opportunity to leverage the core brand to drive financial results

Bear Case

In the downside scenario, we take out \$700M in discretionary, non-maintenance capex and could cut up to \$1.2B if needed

| \$ in thousands | TTM at Close | Fiscal Years Ending December 31, | | | | |
|--|------------------|----------------------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|
| | Dec'23 TTM E | 2024P | 2025P | 2026P | 2027P | 2028P |
| Returns | | | | | | |
| Diligence Adjusted EBITDA | \$557,122 | \$558,110 | \$552,349 | \$534,197 | \$509,885 | \$484,474 |
| Multiple | 7.5x | 7.5x | 7.5x | 7.5x | 7.5x | 7.5x |
| Enterprise Value | 4,178,413 | 4,185,827 | 4,142,617 | 4,006,474 | 3,824,135 | 3,633,552 |
| Cash | 100,000 | 100,000 | 100,000 | 100,000 | 100,000 | 100,000 |
| Transaction Costs | 142,460 | - | - | - | - | - |
| Revolver | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| Term Loan | (1,900,000) | (1,872,088) | (1,757,946) | (1,598,999) | (1,379,208) | (1,170,888) |
| Total Equity Value | 2,520,874 | 2,413,739 | 2,484,671 | 2,507,474 | 2,544,928 | 2,562,664 |
| Sponsor Equity, % of Total Equity | 96.0% | 95.1% | 96.0% | 96.0% | 96.0% | 96.0% |
| Sponsor Equity | 2,420,874 | 2,294,809 | 2,386,107 | 2,408,006 | 2,443,974 | 2,461,006 |
| Financial Forecast | | | | | | |
| Total Revenues | 2,319,163 | 2,363,568 | 2,380,451 | 2,343,579 | 2,277,842 | 2,204,652 |
| Cost of Revenue | (358,180) | (371,980) | (381,628) | (382,600) | (378,558) | (372,870) |
| Gross Profit | 1,960,983 | 1,991,588 | 1,998,823 | 1,960,979 | 1,899,284 | 1,831,783 |
| % of Revenue | 84.6% | 84.3% | 84.0% | 83.7% | 83.4% | 83.1% |
| OpEx | (1,403,862) | (1,433,478) | (1,446,474) | (1,426,782) | (1,389,399) | (1,347,309) |
| Diligence Adjusted EBITDA | 557,122 | 558,110 | 552,349 | 534,197 | 509,885 | 484,474 |
| % of Revenue | 24.0% | 23.6% | 23.2% | 22.8% | 22.4% | 22.0% |
| Taxes | (42,413) | (26,437) | (26,969) | (28,095) | (28,809) | (31,995) |
| Non-Cash Expenses | 48,149 | 5,429 | 5,429 | 5,429 | 5,429 | 5,429 |
| Changes in Working Capital | 64,434 | 9,625 | 6,044 | (7,529) | (14,908) | (16,904) |
| Capex | (276,576) | (301,000) | (228,100) | (173,750) | (98,680) | (99,320) |
| Unlevered Cash Flow | 350,716 | 245,727 | 308,753 | 330,252 | 372,916 | 341,684 |
| Interest Expense | | (217,815) | (194,611) | (171,305) | (153,124) | (133,364) |
| Mandatory Debt Payments | | (19,000) | (19,000) | (19,000) | (19,000) | (19,000) |
| Levered Cash Flow | 8,912 | 95,142 | 139,947 | 200,792 | 189,320 | 189,320 |
| Optional Debt Payment | | (8,912) | (95,142) | (139,947) | (200,792) | (189,319) |
| Levered Cash Flow After Paydown | | - | - | - | - | - |
| Leverage Ratios | | | | | | |
| Net Leverage Ratio -- 4.0x Covenant | 3.2x | 3.2x | 3.0x | 2.8x | 2.5x | 2.2x |
| Creditor Fixed Charge Coverage Ratio | | 1.0x | 1.3x | 1.7x | 2.0x | 2.1x |

Bull Case

In the upside scenario, our operational investments yield strong cash generation which enable us to fully pay off debt

| \$ in thousands | TTM at Close | Fiscal Years Ending December 31, | | | | |
|--|------------------|----------------------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|
| | Dec'23 TTM E | 2024P | 2025P | 2026P | 2027P | 2028P |
| Returns | | | | | | |
| Diligence Adjusted EBITDA | \$557,122 | \$641,897 | \$745,460 | \$860,996 | \$986,182 | \$1,121,544 |
| Multiple | 7.5x | 7.5x | 7.5x | 7.5x | 7.5x | 7.5x |
| Enterprise Value | 4,178,413 | 4,814,230 | 5,590,949 | 6,457,467 | 7,396,367 | 8,411,583 |
| Cash | 100,000 | 100,000 | 100,000 | 100,000 | 100,000 | 219,110 |
| Transaction Costs | 142,460 | - | - | - | - | - |
| Revolver | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| Term Loan | (1,900,000) | (1,774,308) | (1,526,190) | (1,153,945) | (593,851) | - |
| Total Equity Value | 2,520,874 | 3,139,922 | 4,164,759 | 5,403,522 | 6,902,516 | 8,630,694 |
| Sponsor Equity, % of Total Equity | 96.0% | 95.1% | 95.1% | 95.1% | 95.1% | 95.1% |
| Sponsor Equity | 2,420,874 | 2,985,211 | 3,959,553 | 5,137,279 | 6,562,414 | 8,205,441 |
| Financial Forecast | | | | | | |
| Total Revenues | 2,319,163 | 2,657,915 | 3,070,480 | 3,527,780 | 4,019,649 | 4,547,678 |
| Cost of Revenue | (358,180) | (410,110) | (473,319) | (543,298) | (618,462) | (699,041) |
| Gross Profit | 1,960,983 | 2,247,805 | 2,597,160 | 2,984,482 | 3,401,187 | 3,848,637 |
| % of Revenue | 84.6% | 84.6% | 84.6% | 84.6% | 84.6% | 84.6% |
| OpEx | (1,403,862) | (1,605,908) | (1,851,700) | (2,123,486) | (2,415,005) | (2,727,093) |
| Diligence Adjusted EBITDA | 557,122 | 641,897 | 745,460 | 860,996 | 986,182 | 1,121,544 |
| % of Revenue | 24.0% | 24.2% | 24.3% | 24.4% | 24.5% | 24.7% |
| Taxes | (42,413) | (44,984) | (69,285) | (97,310) | (128,769) | (167,328) |
| Non-Cash Expenses | 48,149 | 5,429 | 5,429 | 5,429 | 5,429 | 5,429 |
| Changes in Working Capital | 64,434 | 80,233 | 101,596 | 112,305 | 120,418 | 128,870 |
| Capex | (276,576) | (343,600) | (356,200) | (368,800) | (326,620) | (335,900) |
| Unlevered Cash Flow | 350,716 | 338,975 | 427,000 | 512,620 | 656,640 | 752,615 |
| Interest Expense | | (213,283) | (178,881) | (140,376) | (96,545) | (39,653) |
| Mandatory Debt Payments | | (19,000) | (19,000) | (19,000) | (19,000) | (19,000) |
| Levered Cash Flow | 106,692 | 229,119 | 353,244 | 541,095 | 693,961 | 693,961 |
| Optional Debt Payment | | (106,692) | (229,119) | (353,244) | (541,095) | (574,851) |
| Levered Cash Flow After Paydown | | - | - | - | - | 119,111 |
| Leverage Ratios | | | | | | |
| Net Leverage Ratio -- 4.0x Covenant | 3.2x | 2.6x | 1.9x | 1.2x | 0.5x | (0.2x) |
| Creditor Fixed Charge Coverage Ratio | | 1.1x | 1.5x | 1.9x | 2.7x | 3.5x |

Returns Sensitivity

Returns are sensitive to entry and exit multiples; in downside cases, we see potential for multiple contraction while in base and upside cases, we see potential for multiple expansion

Bear Case

Exit Multiple

Entry Multiple

| | 6.5x | 7.0x | 7.5x | 8.0x | 8.5x |
|------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|
| 6.5x | 1.3% / 1.1x | 3.5% / 1.2x | 5.4% / 1.3x | 7.3% / 1.4x | 9.1% / 1.5x |
| 7.0x | -1.4% / 0.9x | 0.7% / 1.0x | 2.8% / 1.1x | 4.6% / 1.3x | 6.2% / 1.3x |
| 7.5x | -3.8% / 0.8x | -1.6% / 0.9x | 0.3% / 1.0x | 2.2% / 1.1x | 3.9% / 1.2x |
| 8.0x | -5.8% / 0.7x | -3.7% / 0.8x | -1.8% / 0.9x | 0.0% / 1.0x | 1.7% / 1.1x |
| 8.5x | -7.6% / 0.7x | -5.6% / 0.8x | -3.7% / 0.8x | -1.9% / 0.9x | -0.3% / 1.0x |

Base Case

Exit Multiple

Entry Multiple

| | 6.5x | 7.0x | 7.5x | 8.0x | 8.5x |
|------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|
| 6.5x | 22.6% / 2.8x | 24.5% / 3.0x | 26.4% / 3.2x | 28.1% / 3.5x | 29.8% / 3.7x |
| 7.0x | 19.3% / 2.4x | 21.2% / 2.6x | 23.0% / 2.8x | 24.7% / 3.0x | 26.3% / 3.2x |
| 7.5x | 16.4% / 2.1x | 18.3% / 2.3x | 20.1% / 2.5x | 21.7% / 2.7x | 23.3% / 2.8x |
| 8.0x | 13.9% / 1.9x | 15.8% / 2.1x | 17.5% / 2.2x | 19.1% / 2.4x | 20.7% / 2.6x |
| 8.5x | 11.8% / 1.7x | 13.6% / 1.9x | 15.2% / 2.0x | 16.8% / 2.2x | 18.4% / 2.3x |

Bull Case

Exit Multiple

Entry Multiple

| | 6.5x | 7.0x | 7.5x | 8.0x | 8.5x |
|------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|
| 6.5x | 30.7% / 3.8x | 32.6% / 4.1x | 34.4% / 4.4x | 36.1% / 4.7x | 37.7% / 5.0x |
| 7.0x | 27.2% / 3.3x | 29.0% / 3.6x | 30.8% / 3.8x | 32.4% / 4.1x | 34.0% / 4.3x |
| 7.5x | 24.1% / 2.9x | 25.9% / 3.2x | 27.7% / 3.4x | 29.3% / 3.6x | 30.8% / 3.8x |
| 8.0x | 21.5% / 2.6x | 23.3% / 2.8x | 24.9% / 3.0x | 26.5% / 3.2x | 28.0% / 3.4x |
| 8.5x | 19.2% / 2.4x | 20.9% / 2.6x | 22.5% / 2.8x | 24.1% / 2.9x | 25.6% / 3.1x |

Management Case

Exit Multiple

Entry Multiple

| | 6.5x | 7.0x | 7.5x | 8.0x | 8.5x |
|------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|
| 6.5x | 38.0% / 5.0x | 39.9% / 5.4x | 41.6% / 5.7x | 43.3% / 6.0x | 44.9% / 6.4x |
| 7.0x | 34.3% / 4.4x | 36.1% / 4.7x | 37.8% / 5.0x | 39.5% / 5.3x | 41.0% / 5.6x |
| 7.5x | 31.1% / 3.9x | 32.9% / 4.1x | 34.6% / 4.4x | 36.2% / 4.7x | 37.7% / 4.9x |
| 8.0x | 28.3% / 3.5x | 30.0% / 3.7x | 31.7% / 4.0x | 33.3% / 4.2x | 34.8% / 4.4x |
| 8.5x | 25.8% / 3.2x | 27.5% / 3.4x | 29.2% / 3.6x | 30.7% / 3.8x | 32.2% / 4.0x |

Overview of Exit Options





While an IPO is likely the optimal exit, there is a strong universe of potential strategic acquirors and financial sponsors

| Key Exit Considerations | | Potential Buyers | |
|--|--|--|--|
| Initial Public Offering Considerations | <ul style="list-style-type: none">Reality of Scale: Given the size of Dave & Buster's at our base case exit valuation (\$6.8bn), our view is that a public relisting is the most likely scenario, assuming healthy market conditionsPotential Multiple Expansion: While not in our base case assumptions, achieving multi-year growth targets (double-digit revenue CAGR) and optimizing the cost model should bring valuation closer in-line with the peer set (8-11x LTM EBITDA)Access to More Capital: A public relisting enables Dave & Buster's access to a larger pool of capital to fund the next phase of growth (e.g., international expansion) |  | |
| Strategic Buyer Considerations | <ul style="list-style-type: none">Gaming Play: Casino entertainment players might be interested as Dave & Buster's continues to branch into the sports betting world and sports betting legalizes across the countryRestaurants Play: Large restaurant conglomerates could view Dave & Buster's as a way to diversify their roster, revenue stream, and margin profileSynergies Drive Attractive Multiples: Strategics likely to pay higher valuation due to potential synergies (e.g., improved sales and marketing, shared information technology, supply chain efficiencies). In '21, Callaway acquired TopGolf at c. 16x '22E EBITDA | Restaurant Conglomerates  | Casino Entertainment  |
| Financial Sponsor Considerations | <ul style="list-style-type: none">Financial Sponsors Play: Dave & Buster's leading market position, stable growth trajectory, recurring cash flows, and strong management team should attract financial sponsor interestHistorical Precedent: Oak Hill Capital (2014 exit) and Wellspring Capital Management (2010 exit) have made successful returns with Dave & Buster's (2.0x+ MOIC)Scale as Limiting Factor: Given the scale of Dave & Buster's at our projected exit, large buyout / mega-funds will likely be the only sponsors able to write a sufficient equity checkLower Valuations: Expectation is highest valuations will not come from selling to a financial sponsor |  | |

Sources:
Public Filings, Pitchbook, and Internal Booth Research Resources

Looking Ahead: Next Steps

In the next phase of diligence, our focus would revolve around further understanding the industry dynamics, economics at each active store, and growth opportunities outside the US

| Further Diligence | | | |
|------------------------|---|---|---|
| Category | Key Questions / Topics | Ways to Address | Status |
| Industry / Competition | <ul style="list-style-type: none">Health of the end consumer and potential recession impactConsumer satisfaction for Dave & Buster's versus peersSuccessful strategies of local boutique playersPotential M&A opportunities | <ul style="list-style-type: none">Third-party customer analysis (net promoter score, customer satisfaction score, customer effort score, customer surveys)Deep-dive on smaller players in attractive MSAs (high-margin entertainment offerings, marketing strategies, etc.)Analysis on potential M&A opportunities to target adjacent markets |  |
| Financial | <ul style="list-style-type: none">Unit-level contributions (unit volume, growth, margins, etc.)Supplier contract detailsCommodity and labor inflation strategiesCurrent operating lease details | <ul style="list-style-type: none">Detailed analysis of all 211 stores across the platformDetailed analysis of supply chain and supplier contracts (terms, past negotiations, etc.)Analysis to potentially hedge certain price fluctuationsAnalysis of current operating leases terms (cancellation penalty, renewal status, etc.) |  |
| Expansion | <ul style="list-style-type: none">Target MSA characteristicsReal estate and operating lease terms at target MSAsRisks related to development costs and supply chainFeasibility and scalability of international franchising model | <ul style="list-style-type: none">Deep-dive on target MSAs (demographics, market saturation, competition, consumer behavior, and legal regulations)Market study on availability of appropriate real estate and lease terms at target MSAsLine-item analysis on development costs and potential supply chain issuesConversations with potential franchisees outside the US on opportunities |  |
| Operations | <ul style="list-style-type: none">Individual marketing and sales initiatives assessment across platform (media presence, strategy, brand)Food & beverage and entertainment assessmentService staff evaluation (performance, compensation, satisfaction of employees) and availability of new talentFeasibility and scalability of sports betting partnershipsFurther assess current ESG goals and initiatives | <ul style="list-style-type: none">Deep-dive on primary drivers of customer visits and assess if effectively targeting core and growth audiencesEntertainment and food & beverage menu analysis to identify popular and underperforming items across storesAnalysis of employees KPI's, turnover, comp structure, and market benchmarkingConversations with casino / gambling companies on potential partnershipsEngage ESG-focused consulting firm to audit current sustainability practices (energy, water, and waster management) |  |
| Third Party Diligence | <ul style="list-style-type: none">Tax, Insurance, Legal / Regulatory, Technology / IT, HR / Benefits, Background Checks | | |

| Identify, Introduce, and Interview Candidates for Board Roles | |
|--|--|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none">Preliminary independent board member appointees include Kat Cole (ex President & COO of Focus Brands) or Urvi Patel (SVP, Customer Experience & Engagement at Focus Brands) for food & beverage expertise, Josh D’Amaro (Chairman of Disney Parks, Experiences, and Products) for entertainment expertise, and Andy Adams (SVP Store Development at Starbucks) for store expansion expertise | |

Looking Ahead: Q1 Plan (First ~100 Days)

In the first 100 days, we will work with management to make sure we have a strong long-term strategic plan and near-term execution plan, identify talent needs and gaps, and develop management systems to ensure seamless implementation of our growth initiatives

| | January | | | | | February | | | | March | | | |
|------------------------|--|-----|------|------|------|---|------|------|------|--|------|------|------|
| | 1/1 | 1/8 | 1/15 | 1/22 | 1/29 | 1/8 | 1/15 | 1/22 | 1/29 | 1/8 | 1/15 | 1/22 | 1/29 |
| Strategy & Operations | <div>Mgmt. Meetings</div> <div>Meet with management to establish collaborative rapport and garner perspectives</div> | | | | | <div>Strategic Plan</div> <div>Hold a workshop with management to develop a long-range strategic plan with high-level paths to value creation Develop near-term OKRs for Growth and Margin 2024 plans to aim for</div> | | | | <div>Year 1 Growth Plan</div> <div>Review and align on Year 1 growth plan, focusing on prioritization within store expansion and revenue per store enhancement workstreams</div> | | | |
| | | | | | | <div>Year 1 Margin Plan</div> <div>Review and align on Year 1 margin plan, focusing on prioritization of initiatives and investment</div> | | | | <div>Year 1 Budget</div> <div>Based on '24 operational plans, develop Year 1 budget, including employee incentive program.</div> | | | |
| Human Capital | | | | | | <div>Talent Review</div> <div>Hire a third-party talent evaluation firm to identify talent needs</div> | | | | <div>Key Hires</div> <div>Identify, introduce, interview candidates for key operational roles.</div> | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | <div>Board Appointments¹</div> <div>Identify, introduce, and interview candidates for board roles.</div> | | | |
| Reporting & Monitoring | | | | | | <div>Sponsor Update Materials</div> <div>Align on reporting requirements and cadence with management Develop templates & materials for reporting</div> | | | | <div>Board Update Materials</div> <div>Align on reporting requirements and cadence with management Develop templates and materials for reporting</div> | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | |

Footnotes:
¹ Preliminary independent board member appointees include Kat Cole (ex President & COO of Focus Brands) or Urvi Patel (SVP, Customer Experience & Engagement at Focus Brands) for food & beverage expertise, Josh D’Amaro (Chairman of Disney Parks, Experiences, and Products) for entertainment expertise, and Andy Adams (SVP Store Development at Starbucks) for store expansion expertise